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HISTORY AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION: THE
EARLY DISTORTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT BY THE GILDED AGE COURT
Edward M. Gaffney, Jr.*

I.

LAW, HISTORY, AND LEGAL HISTORY

I can only hope that the result of the book [A History of English
Law] will be to demonstrate, firstly, the essential incompleteness
of English histories in which no account is taken of the legal point
of view, and secondly, the impossibility of gaining a complete grasp
of the principles of English law without a study of their history.1
In the preface to his monumental, fifteen-volume A History of English
Law, Sir William Holdsworth succinctly states the mutual relationship
between law and history. When considered in the American context, Sir
Holdsworth's observation remains viable, but emphasis should be placed on
his second observation; it seems more common for historians and students of
history to be familiar with the holdings of Marbury v. Madison,2 Dred Scott
v. Sandford,3 Miranda v. Arizona,4 and Roe v. Wade5 than it is for lawyers
and law students to place significant constitutional rulings within their historical context.
Morton Horwitz has recently suggested that lawyers rarely pay ;attention
to the way in which the legal tradition has been shaped by "both the
internal demand of professionalization and the external demand for creating an ideological buffer zone between the claims of politics and those of
law."6 As a result, the legal tradition-the "prime matter" of American legal
history-has been treated as a kind of meta-historical set of eternal values
* Instructor in Law and Religion, Boston College. B.A., 1963, St. Patrick's College; S.T.L., 1967, Gregorian University (Rome); J.D., M.A. (Legal History), 1975,
Catholic University of America.
1. W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW viii (1931).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
3. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.275, 278 (1973).
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rather than as the contingent, changing product of specific historical struggles
within which social conflict always takes place. Horwitz noted further that,
for decades, American legal history remained isolated within a narrow mold
of technicalities imposed by lawyers untrained in the discipline of history or
of other human sciences. Shaped by the dominant influence of Dean Roscoe
Pound, the basic categories of American legal history were shot through with
unexamined, conservative political choices disguised in the neutral garb of
"objective" history. 7 For example, Pound thought of "the received legal
tradition" as a sort of anti-Marxist medicine which would immunize legal historians against the dread disease of serious economic analysis. 8 In a similar
vein, lack of skill in economic interpretation led Oliver Wendell Holmes to
ascribe the 19th century movement towards fault liability to the triumph of
a nonhistorical "common sense" rather than to the conscious desire of railroads and other business enterprises to reduce the costs of development and
expansion.9
Writing in 1941, Daniel Boorstin urged a change in this approach of
searching the past only for distant legal principles. He urged instead an
awareness "that law itself is a part of history,"' 10 a viewpoint that would lead
lawyers and legal historians to a concern for the relationship between legal
institutions and the rest of society, and ultimately "into -the materials of
economic and social history.""
Legal history in the broader sense advocated by Boorstin has fortunately
come into its own. Witness the steady flow of perceptive articles on legal
history in law reviews and scholarly journals (most notably The American Journal of Legal History), the gradual appearance of the Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court under the general editorship of Paul A.
Freund,'1 2 the contribution of several significant studies by a nonlawyer,
Leonard W. Levy, 13 and with the recent appearance of Lawrence M. Fried7. Id. at 275-76.
8. See Pound, The Economic Interpretationand the Law of Torts, 53 HARv. L. REV.
365, 366 (1940).
9. Holmes, Agency, II, 5 HARv. L. REV. 1, 16 (1891).
10. Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARv. L. REV. 424, 434
(1941).
11. Id. at436.
12. Three volumes of the scheduled eleven-volume work have already appeared: C.
FAIRMAN,
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1864-88 (1971); J.
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man's A History of American Law, a book in which the author deals with
American law "not as a kingdom unto itself, not as a set of rules and concepts, not as the province of lawyers alone, but as a mirror of society."' 4
Before defining the canons of historical method and assessing Supreme
Court performance in light of them, it is important to differentiate the various
meanings of the term "history" as used in the context of legal opinions. First
there is "internal history," or documents which are intrinsic to the legal
process, and upon which courts must rely in their every decision. Such internal history would obviously include the text of the fundamental law, or constitutions, of the United States and the several states, statutes enacted by
Congress land the state legislatures, and judicial decisions which serve as binding precedents. But there is also an "external history," or history which
serves either to illuminate the meaning of the constitutions and statutes in
their original context, or to reveal conditions in the nation since ratification
or promulgation which have a bearing on subsequent interpretation.
In a sense, then, the Supreme Court is daily engaged in the task of interpreting history, for it must constantly refer to prior texts as a reference point
for its decisionmaking. The way in which members of the Court perform
the task of interpreting those texts, however, as well as the use they make
of external history to bolster their ratio decidendi in specific instances, together constitute grounds for an interdisciplinary dialogue between law and
history. In other words, as long as Justices of the Supreme Court write history in their opinions, they should know what historians generally consider
essential to an honest and fruitful performance of the historical task.
Historians have roundly criticized the Supreme Court for its use of history.
In order to appreciate the point of such criticism, it is necessary first to state
four canons of historical method formulated by the Canadian philosopher
Bernard J. F. Lonergan: be attentive to all the data; be intelligent in
interpretation of the data; be reasonable in verifying the accuracy of one's
CRIMINATION

PRESS

(1968); L.

LEVY,

LEGACY

IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY

WEALTH AND

OF SUPPRESSION:

FREEDOM

OF SPEECH AND

(1960); L.

LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONCHIEF JUSTICE SHAW: THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1830-1860

(1957).
14. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 10 (1973). In the conclusion of
this book, Professor Friedman states well for the American context what Holdsworth
said for the English context:
If by law one means an organized system of social control, any society of any
size and complexity has law. As long as the country endures, so will its system of law, coextensive with society, reflecting its wishes and needs, in all their
irrationality, ambiguity, and inconsistency . .

.

. A full history of American

law would be nothing more or less than a full history of American life.
Id. at 595.
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interpretation; and be responsible.'
These canons form a basic touchstone
against which one can evaluate the methodological integrity not only of the

Court but of its critics as well.

Historical knowledge is simply a specific

instance of knowledge; knowledge is not attained by neglecting relevant data,

by failing to grasp the significance of data, or by refusing to account reasonably for one's judgments.
Under Lonergan's method, the historian is first called on to attend to all
data within the scope of his inquiry. Such attention calls for objectivity, but
not the 19th century view of objectivity which embraced only that which was
to be seen, a notion which demanded of the historian a "pure receptivity that
admitted impressions from phenomena but excluded any subjective activity."" 6 The attention involved here is to be paid by the historian, acting as

a conscious subject who is bound to be influenced by his own world view
and philosophy.
Second, there is 'the duty of the historian to be intelligent in his interpretation of the data. This duty imposes a threefold exegetical task on the his-

torian: to understand the text, to judge the accuracy of his understanding,
and to state what he judges to be the correct meaning of the text. In understanding the text, the historian may not assume the worth of what Lonergan
calls the "Principle of the Empty Head"-that the less one knows, the better
an exegete he will be. 17 On the contrary, "the greater the exegete's resources, the greater the likelihood that he will be able to enumerate all
possible interpretations and assign to each its proper measure of probability.' u8 In the context of constitutional history, for example, a knowledge of
both the Articles of Confederation which preceded the Constitution and of
the debates accompanying the adoption of the Constitution can be of some
assistance in understanding specific constitutional texts. By the same token,
however, if one relies on the Federalist Papers'9 for such understanding without recognizing their political character as the propaganda of an antipopulist party which purported to represent "the education, the talents, the
virtues, and the property of the country, ' 20 one is bound to have difficulty
15. B. LONERGAN,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

METHOD IN THEOLOGY 20, 53, 231-32, 302 (1972).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 157, 204-23.
Id. at 156.
THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Stoddert, Mar. 31, 1801, reprinted in 9

THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 582 (C. Adams ed. 1854).

See also C. BEARD, AN Eco(1929); ESSAYS
ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (L. Levy ed. 1969); M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES

NOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781 (1940).
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in judging the correctness of one's understanding of the text. Similarly, if
one states that he has discovered the intent of the framers on a specific text,
he may still be far from a correct statement of that text for purposes of resolving a present dispute, as recent litigation on the establishment clause of the
first amendment amply illustrates. 21 In this sense, Justice Brennan was quite
right when he acknowledged in 1963 that "an awareness of history and an
appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers do not always resolve concrete problems."' 22 The context of a statement can be crucial to its content;
it can be anachronistic, then, to ask an 18th century text to resolve a subsequent issue not even imagined when the text was written.
Third, the historian must be reasonable; he must attempt to verify the
accuracy of his interpretation. For Lonergan, the test is
[whether or not] insights are invulnerable, whether or not they hit
the bull's eye, whether or not they meet all relevant questions so
that there are no further questions that can lead to further insights
21
and so complement, qualify, correct the insights already possessed.
The point here is not simply that the historian searches for the right questions
as well as for answers, but that in the process his questions and answers must
become interlocked in such a way as to effectuate "the eventual enclosure
of the interrelated multiplicity within a higher limited unity," in order that
he be able "to recognize the task as completed and to pronounce [his]
interpretation as probable, highly probable, in some respects, perhaps,
certain."

24

21. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 119,
137-42, and the cases cited therein, for a discussion of the Supreme Court's application
of history to the controversy over the proper delineation of the line between church and

state. In his conclusion, the author notes:
The church-state matters to which Jefferson, Madison, Fisher, Ames and the
others of the First Congress were addressing themselves are not resolvable by
any plausible process of historical reasoning into a solution of the problem of
aid for parochial schools, lunch programs, bus transportation, [and] released
time. The application of precedent, legal continuity, and balanced contemporary socio-political theory is almost certain to produce a more intelligent result
than is the attempt to use a few scattered historical documents as though they
possessed the qualities of Holy Writ.

Most inquiry into the past illustrates dra-

matically the discontinuity of culture and social process rather than their continuity. A more sophisticated and restrained approach to the use of history by
the Court might well take this fact into account.
Id. at 156-57.
22. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's opinion discusses why history can and should be treated
with respect but without slavish obedience to the past.
23. B. LONERGAN, supra note 15, at 162.
24. Id. at 165.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 25:207

The historian, then, cannot be value-free in the sense of refraining from
all value judgments, for he is bound to make some such judgments; he should
be value-free, however, at least to the extent of recognizing that his own value
judgments neither constitute empirical evidence nor settle matters of fact. 25

Finally, the historian is asked to remain detached from all bias which, for
Lonergan, represents a distortion or a block in intellectual development. 26
Indeed, says Lonergan, the historian has a greater need of such detachment
from bias than the natural scientist whose work is more adequately objectified and publicly controlled.27 Such detachment is not to be conceived of
in terms of a naive objectivism that ignores the subjectivity of the historian.
On the contrary, it is only when the historian consciously makes unremitting
efforts to overcome bias and to verify his interpretations and judgments that
genuine detachment in the writing of history can ever be achieved.
11[.THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS USE OF HISTORY:
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

Since the scope of the Supreme Court's use of history is too broad for
intelligent treatment within the confines of a single article, this effort will concentrate on the Supreme Court of the "Gilded Age,"' 28 i.e., post-Reconstruction, and the manner in which the Court during this time utilized history in
its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. As background for that
analysis, an examination of critical commentary on the Court's approach to
history and examples of the Court's use of "internal history" are in order.
25. See id. at 232-33. See also Dray, History and Value Judgments, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 26-30 (P. Edwards ed. 1967).
26. See B. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 191-205, 21844 (1957), in which the author differentiates four domains of bias: unconscious motivation, individual egoism, group egoism, and general egoism. See also B. LONERGAN,
supra note 15, at 217-20.
27. See B. LONERGAN, supra note 15, at 230-32. Lonergan states that "the only adequate positive control is to have another historian go over the same evidence." Id. at
231.
28. The phrase "Gilded Age" was coined by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley

Warner to describe America during the 1870's. They used it as the title of a satirical
novel, in the preface to which they stated with tongue in cheek:
In a state where there is no fever of speculation, no inflamed desire for sudden

wealth, where the poor are simple-minded and contented, and the rich all honest and generous, where society is in a condition of primative purity and politics the occupation of only the capable and patriotic, there are necessarily no
materials for such a history as we have constructed out of an ideal common-

wealth.
S. CLEMENS & C. WARNER, THE GILDED AGE v-vi (1873). When used in the context
of this article, the reference is to the Court from around 1865 until the turn of the century.
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A.

Early Criticism of the Court's Use of History

Students of American legal history have grown accustomed to recent
attacks on the Supreme Court's use of history.2 9 Today's student may
be unaware, however, that critics of the Supreme Court have been questioning the Justices about their use of history from the earliest days of the Court.
As early as 1816, Spencer Roane of the Virginia Supreme Court criticized
the Court's use of history when he rebuked his fellow Virginian John Marshall for the Federalist Chief Justice's nationalistic dicta in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,3 0 which Judge Roane deemed to be contrary to the intent of the
Founding Fathers on the true locus of sovereignty in the new "confederation."'" Shortly thereafter, James Madison expressed the fear that the
Marshall Court was interpreting the Constitution not according to "its true
meaning as understood by the nation at the time of its ratification, ' 32 but
according to the needs of commercial interests.
The Taney Court had its historical critics as well. Indeed, two of the
29. See, e.g., Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and ludicial History, 85 POL. Sci. Q. 1 (1969). Levy claims that in their interpretations of the fifth
amendment,
[t]he justices stand censured for abusing historical evidence in a way that reflects adversely on their intellectual rectitude as well as on their historical competence . . . . The Court artfully selects historical facts from one side only,
ignoring contrary data, in order to support, rationalize, or give the appearance
of respectability to judgments resting on other grounds.
Id.
Others who have criticized the Court's use of history include Alfred Kelly, who
charged the Court with writing "very bad history indeed," with using "evidence
wrenched from its contemporary historical context," and with "carefully select[ing]
those materials designed to prove the thesis at hand, suppressing all data that might impeach the desired historical conclusions," Kelly, supra note 21, at 126; Paul L. Murphy,
who expressed chagrin at the Court's reliance on "a shockingly inaccurate use of historical data," Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIsT. REV. 64, 65 (1963); Alexander M. Bickel, who chastised
the Court for its reading of the history of the fourteenth amendment with regard to racial segregation, Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HAsv. L. REv. 1 (1955); and John Wofford, who took issue with the Court's assertion
that the free speech clause of the first amendment was intended to supersede the English common law of seditious libel and who, in support of his claim, gathered considerable historical evidence which the Court either overlooked or suppressed. Wofford, The
Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. Cm. L.
REV. 502 (1964).

30. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
31. See 2 BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS 51-52, 56-57 (W. Dodd ed. 1905); C. HAINES,
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PoLmrlcs-1789-

1835, at 340 (1944).
32. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 74 (G. Hunt ed. 1901-1910), cited in Kelly,
supra note 21, at 120.
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critics sat on the Court.33 Dissenting in Dred Scott v. Sandford,3 4 Justice
McLean noted that Taney's reference to the intent of the framers in regard
to the citizenship for blacks overlooked a significant debate on the nature
of slavery, in which James Madison opposed Pinckney's motion to extend the
period of importation to 1808. 35 Another dissenter in Dred Scott, Justice
Curtis, also challenged Taney's historical accuracy in denying the American
citizenship of.free persons descended from African slaves at the time the Constitution was adopted.3 6 A third critic of the Dred Scott decision was
Abraham Lincoln, who disputed the historical accuracy of Chief Justice
Taney's claim that blacks were excluded from the meaning of "men" or "per37
sons" in the Declaration of Independence.
In sum, criticism of the Supreme Court's craftsmanship, although undertaken with greater zeal recently 3a than in the past, has firm antecedents in
the 19th century, and, as Justice Frankfurter has acknowledged, that is as
it should be:
Judges as persons, or courts as institutions, are entitled to no greater
immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions ...
[J]udges must be kept mindful of their limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however blunt.89
33. The two were Justice McLean and Justice Curtis.
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
35. Justice McLean quoted Madison in support of his position:
Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the
liberty to import slaves; so long a term will be more dishonorable to the American character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution. (Madison Papers.)
Id. at 536 (McLean, J., dissenting).
36. Justice Curtis framed the issue as follows:
To determine whether any free persons, descended from Africans held in
slavery, were citizens of the United States under the Confederation, and consequently at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States,
it is only necessary to know whether any such persons were citizens of either
of the States under the Confederation, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Of this there can be no doubt.
id. at 572 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
37. See THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 219, 233, 304 (R. Johannsen
ed. 1965).
38. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT

OF REFORM

(1968); F.

GRAHAM,

THE DUE

PROCESS

REVO-

(1970); P. KURLAND, POLC. MILLER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY (1969). For trenchant criticism of the Burger Court,
see L. LEvY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974).
39. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
LUrTON: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW
mcs, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970);
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B.

The Relevance of Internal History

As described above, "internal history" refers to legal documents intrinsic
to the process of judicial decisionmaking. The first area of internal history
subject to historical criticism is the Court's understanding of the Constitution
itself. Some Justices conceive of the Constitution in a static fashion as a
changeless document with invariant meaning.4 0 Rather than acknowledge that
significant shifts in cultural and social contexts may result in meanings never
imagined in the 18th century, advocates of this "constant meaning" theory
allow only for a shift in the application of the old and invariant meaning to
41
new situations.
Although few Justices have addressed themselves explicitly to the
philosophical question of historical meaning, some have at least opted for a
more dynamic conception of the Constitution than that espoused by the "constant meaning" proponents. Justice Brandeis, for example, expressed a
strong conviction that "our Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living
organism. As such it is capable of growth--of expansion and adaptation to
new conditions. Growth implies changes, political, economic, and social."' 42
40. A classic statement of this viewpoint is found in South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), in which Justice Brewer stated: "The Constitution is a
written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it meant when
adopted it means now." Id. at 448.
41. Justice Sutherland, dissenting in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934), characterized this process by stating:
The provisions of the Federal Constitution, undoubtedly, are pliable in the
sense that in appropriate cases they have the capacity of bringing within their
grasp every new condition which falls within their meaning. But, their meaning is changeless; it is only their applicationwhich is extensible.
Id. at 451 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
For a brief but perceptive essay on Blaisdell, see C. MILLER, supra note 38, at 3951. Elsewhere in the work, Miller criticized Justice Sutherland's dichotomy between meaning and application, stating:
Many constitutional lawyers have found this distinction between meaning and
application perfectly intelligible. Not only do they believe in an immortal
Constitution, but they believe also in immortal constitutional essences or ideas,
with a priori definitions. In this scheme the Constitution defines meanings
which, when applied to various circumstances, become the judicial contribution to the Constitution. Under the influence of pragmatism in philosophy
and functionalism in jurisprudence, however, most people now understand that
meaning and application are at least interdependent, or that they are identical,
or even that meaning depends upon application rather than the other way
around.
Id. at 151.
42. Brandeis Papers, on file at Harvard Law School Library, quoted in A. BIcKEL,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 20 (1970).
Professor Bickel noted
that Justice Brandeis penned the passage for a dissent in United States v. Moreland, 258
U.S. 433 (1922), but omitted it at the behest of a colleague. Id.
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This view of the Constitution as a developmental instrument of social meaning found adherents on the Court in numerous Justices, from Chief Justice
John Marshall, who spoke of the necessity of 'adapting the Constitution to
"various crises of human affairs,"'48 to Chief Justice Earl Warren, who stated:
"For the Constitution to have vitality, this Court must be able to apply its
principles to situations that may not have been foreseen at the time those
'4 4
principles were adopted."
A second issue regarding "internal history" focuses on whether or not -the

Court should rely on legislative history in the construction of statutes
presented to the Court. On the one hand, according to Chief Justice
Marshall, "[w]here the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature,
it seizes everything from which aid can be derived. ' 45 Taking a contrary
position, Justice Day stated in Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston
Co.,4 6 that there is no compulsion to resort to the "extraneous statements and

often unsatisfactory aid" of legislative history when "the words of the act are
plain and their meaning is apparent. '4 7 It should be noted that attempts to
ascertain the intention of the legislature through recourse to travaux
priparatoiresare characteristic of the civil law tradition, whereas English
courts generally refuse to consider such legislative material, preferring to rest
their decisions on the "plain meaning" of the words used. 48 No such systematic rationale regarding the use of legislative history can be discerned
from the practice of the United States Supreme Court, which seems to rely
on legislative history whenever it will bolster an opinion, and to ignore it
whenever it would complicate an otherwise tidy opinion. The Court has thus
opened itself to charges of violation of Lonergan's first canon-be attentiveby its selectivity in the use or nonuse of material normally deemed relevant
to statutory construction.
A third instance of the Court's use of internal history is its reliance on judicial precedents as controlling, at least by analogy, the case at bar. The
doctrine of stare decisis is, of course, neither a facile nor an automatic determinant of the outcome of a case, since the Court must select, from among
the cases offered 'by opposing counsel, which rules of law most nearly fit the
context of 'the case being litigated. Historians should not fault the Justices
for the mere fact that they are selective, for that is intrinsic to the judicial
process. But Lonergan's first canon-be attentive-applies whenever the
43.
44.
45.
46.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
258 U.S. 346 (1922).

47. Id. at 356. See generally 'Edwards v. Douglas, 269 U.S. 204, 211 (1925).
48. See D. LLOYD, INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 733-43 (1972).
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Justices overlook or ignore without comment precedents which are squarely
on point. His second canon-be intelligent-applies whenever the Justices
misstate or misunderstand the holding in a prior case. And his third canonbe reasonable--applies whenever one precedent is chosen over an equally
applicable but contrary precedent because of the Justices' unexplained
preferences. Value judgments, while inevitable, neither settle matters of fact
nor constitute empirical evidence.
Several concrete instances suffice to illustrate this difficulty in the Court's
use of internal history. First, in the 1973 abortion cases, 49 Justice Blackmun
cited State v. Murphy5" for the proposition that the anti-abortion legislation
of the 19th century was intended solely to protect the pregnant woman, and
that "[t]he few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late
19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the state's interest in protecting
the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus." 5' 1
Justice Blackmun's sweeping historical generalization flew in the face of evidence presented to the Court four months earlier in the appellant's brief in
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.52 In Byrn, the Court was
advised of 11 state court decisions in the 19th and 20th centuries which
had stated explicitly and unambiguously that protection of the life of an
unborn child was at least one of the purposes of the respective state's abortion
statutes;3 the Court was also advised of nine decisions in which state courts
clearly implied that one of the purposes of the relevent statute was the protection of the unborn children. 54 Most surprisingly, the one 1858 case which
49. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. 27 N.J.L. 112 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1858), cited in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151
n.48 (1973).
51. 410 U.S. at 151.
52. Brief for Appellant, Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosp. Corp., 410 U.S. 949
(1973) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question).
53. The eleven decisions cited were: Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 73 So. 834
(1916), cert. denied, 198 Ala. 695, 73 So. 1002 (1917); Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo.
514 (1872); Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273 (1934); State v. Miller, 90 Kan.
230, 133 P. 878 (1913); State v. Gedicke, 43 N.J.L. 86 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1881); State v.
Tippie, 89 Ohio St. 35, 105 N.E. 75 (1913); Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 54
P.2d 666 (1936); State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 167 P. 1019 (1917), appeal dismissed
on consent, 251 U.S. 563 (1919); State v. Howard, 32 Vt. 380 (1859); Anderson v.
Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 58 S.E.2d 72 (1950); State v. Cox, 197 Wash. 67, 84 P.2d
357 (1938).
54. The nine decisions were: Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881); State v.
Moore, 25 Iowa 128 (1868); Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48 (1851); Worthington v. State,
92 Md. 222, 48 A. 355 (1901); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 26 N.W. 291 (1886);
Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 112 N.W. 611 (1907); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H.
483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631 (1850); State v.
Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091 (1898).
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Justice Blackmun cited in support of his historical assertion had been overruled in 1881 on the very point for which Justice Blackmun cited it; in State
v. Gedicke,55 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that, contrary to Murphy,
the New Jersey statute was designed "to protect the life of the child also,
and inflict the same punishment, in case of its death, as if the mother should
die." 56 Robert M. Byrn has pointed out other historical errors committed
by Justice Blackmun in the abortion cases, such as the apparent acceptance
of the notion that abortion was not a crime at common law. 57 Whatever one
may think of the results reached in Roe and Doe, Justice Blackmun's casual
use of precedents is an instance of the Court's failure in its use of internal
history.
A second instance of such historical carelessness can be found in Kastigar
v. United States,5 8 in which the Court held that the grant of "use immunity" 59
rather than "transactional immunity" 60 sufficed to compel testimony of a witness before a grand jury. In a brief historical essay, Justice Powell, citing
a 1562 statute, 6' extolled the virtues of the grand jury in English law, and,
citing a 1612 case,6 2 stated that "all subjects owed the King their 'knowledge
and discovery.' "63 Nowhere in his short historical excursus did Justice
Powell note that neither the statute nor the case refer explicitly to the institution of the grand jury; further, he omits to state a highly relevant fact: that
after considerable debate about the dangers which the grand jury posed for
individual freedom, the English abolished this prosecutorial tool in 1925.
A third instance of slipshod historical craftsmanship is in Justice Powell's
reading of the purpose of the exclusionary rule solely as a deterrent to unlawful police misconduct in violation of the fourth amendment guarantee against
55. 43 N.J.L. 86 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1881).
56. Id. at 90.
57. Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L.
REv. 807 (1973). See also Byrn, Wade and Bolton: Fundamental Legal Errors and
Dangerous Implications, 19 THE CATH. LAw. 243 (1973); Gaffney, Law and Theology: A Dialogue on the Abortion Decisions, 33 THE JuRisT 134, 136-42 (1973).
58. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
59. "Use immunity" was defined by the Court as a promise to the witness of "immunity from the use of compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom." Id. at 443.
The practical effect of this grant of immunity is that if the witness were subsequently
prosecuted, the prosecutor would have the burden of showing that the evidence introduced was not derived from the compelled testimony but from independent sources.
60. "Transactional immunity" is a "grant [of] immunity from prosecution for offenses to which compelled testimony relates." Id. In other words, it is a bar to subsequent prosecution of the witness for offenses to which the compelled testimony relates.
61. 406 U.S. at 443, n.3, citing Statute of Elizabeth, 5 Eliz. 1, ch. 9, § 12 (1562).
62. ld. n.4, citing Countess of Shrewsbury's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 769 (1612).
63. Id.
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unreasonable searches and seizures. In United States v. Calandra,6 4 the
Court ruled that illegally obtained evidence and the fruits of such evidence
can be used before a grand jury and held that a witness before a grand jury
cannot refuse to answer questions based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and seizure. Justice Powell asserted that the exclusionary rule
was only a judicially created rule of evidence to deter unlawful police misconduct rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved by the
unlawful search and seizure. 65 Once again, there is a problem of selectivity
of data. To maintain his position, Justice Powell relied on an inference from
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado,66 in which the Court
67
declined to extend the federal exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States
to state proceedings. But Justice Powell overlooked contrary data which
emerged after Wolf: when the Court overturned Wolf in the 1961 case of
Mapp v. Ohio,68 it rejected as erroneous Justice Frankfurter's notion that the
exclusionary rule was not a constitutional requirement of the fourth amendment.6 9 Dissenting in Calandra,Justice Brennan pointed out Justice Powell's
historical oversight and noted that the exclusionary rule was adopted for at
least two other purposes more significant than the deterrence of police
misconduct: (1) to provide an enforcement tool giving content and meaning
to the fourth amendment guarantees of personal security for one's person,
papers, and effects; and (2) to insure that the judiciary avoid even the slight70
est appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct.
Finally, in recent years Justice Rehnquist has demonstrated that historical
selectivity can lead to incongruous results which might be amusing were it
not for the loss of a significant right by parties before the Supreme Court.
Justice iRehnquist is apparently of the opinion that the closer in time
an observer is to an event, the more probably accurate is his interpretation
of the event. Specifically, as he noted in Ham v. South Carolina,71 he relies
on Justice Miller's dictum in the Slaughter-House Cases72 that the principal
purpose of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was to
prohibit the states from discriminating against blacks.7 3 In accordance with
64. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
65. Id. at 347-48.
66. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
67. 232 U.S. 383 (.1914).
68. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
69. Id. at 655-57.
70. 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973).
72. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
73. Id. at 81. Justice Miller's characterization of the amendment's impact was as follows:
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of dis-
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this belief, Justice Rehnquist ruled in Ham that the fourteenth amendment
demands that a trial judge questioning prospective jurors in voir dire must
probe the possibility of their racial animus against a black defendant. 74
However, even though the defendant wore a beard and was charged with
possession of marijuana, Justice Rehnquist held that the trial judge need not
put any question to the jurors about their possible prejudice against the long
hair or beard of the defendant, or whether they had been prejudiced against
the defendant by a public television broadcast against drug offenders by the
State's chief witness, a police officer. 75 For Justices Douglas and Marshall,
this distinction without a difference was unacceptable judicial hairsplitting.
They concurred -that the judge was constitutionally required to probe for racial prejudice, but dissented on the ground that the judge had abused his
discretion when he precluded an inquiry into the juror's prejudice on hair
length. 78 For them, the point at stake was the defendant's constitutional
right to a trial by a neutral and impartial jury, which right can be infringed
not only by racial bias but by subtler forms of prejudice as well. While -the
dissenting Justices cited cases which the opinion of the Court passed over in
silence, 77 it should also be noted that Justice Rehnquist overlooked another
section of the Slaughter-House Cases, in which Justice Miller noted: "We
' 78
do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection.
Other examples of misuses of legal history in the United States Reports
are numerous, but these four should suffice to demonstrate the point of
Robert Schuyler's complaint: "Unfortunately, a knowledge of American
[and English] history has not yet been made a prerequisite for admission to
'7 9
the Supreme Court."
crimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever
be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary
for its application to any other.
Id.
74. 409 U.S. at 526-27.
75. Id. at 527-28.
76. Id. at 529-30 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); id. at 532-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
77. Justice Douglas cited Morford v. United States, 339 U.S. 258 (1950), and Dennis
v. United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1949), as instances in which defendants were held to
have the right to inquire into possible bias other than racial prejudice. 409 U.S. at 529
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).

Justice Marshall cited several cases and quoted ex-

tensively from Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961), which quoted Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155 (1878): "'The theory of the law is that a juror who
has formed an opinion cannot be impartial.'" 409 U.S. at 531 (Marshall, J., dissenting
in part).
78. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
79. R. SCHUYLER, THE CONsTrTUION OF THE UNITED STATES 92 (1923). A more
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THE GILDED AGE COURT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Ham serves as an introduction to the theme
explored herein: the distortion of the fourteenth amendment in the 19th century. Misuse of history becomes apparent in three areas of fourteenth
amendment analysis by the Gilded Age Court: the extension of substantive
due process protection to economic interests of corporate "persons," the denial of procedural due process to criminal defendants in state proceedings,
and the tragic failure of the Court to safeguard the privileges and immunities of newly emancipated black citizens or to extend to them the equal protection of the laws.
The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments were designed to
abolish slavery, to grant federal protection to the civil rights of the newly
emancipated black Americans, and to secure the right to vote against racial
discrimination, whether by the federal government or by the states. Nevertheless, neither the text of these amendments nor the series of civil rights statutes enacted by Congress in 1866,80 1870,81 1871,82 and 187583 proved to
be an effective guarantee of civil rights for blacks during the 19th century.
Some of the blame for this tragic chapter in American legal history is to be
laid at the doorstep of the Supreme Court for the constitutional blessings they
gave to the Compromise of 1877,4 which marked the end of Reconstruction
and the abandonment of the cause of federally protected civil rights for black
Americans.
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once stated with more candor than
discretion that "[w]e are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what
trenchant comment on the same theme is found in J. O'NELL, RELIoION AND EDUCATrON
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949), in which the author states:
My criticism is not that the Justices have interpreted historical facts or phrases

in a way that seems to me unjustified from the standpoint of either semantics or history, but that these Justices of the Supreme Court apparently do not
know the most important facts of our constitutional history which have a bearing on the questions they are deciding. The other possibility is that they do

know the facts but either callously ignore them, or willfully misrepresent them.
Id. at 3. The specific focus of the author's criticism was Justice Black's opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
80. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1-10, 14 Stat. 27. The congressional debate on
this Act is set forth in 1 CIVIL RIGHTS (STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES)

99-150 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970).
81. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, §§ 1-23, 16 Stat. 140, as amended, Act of Feb.
28, 1871, ch. 99, § 20, 16 Stat. 433.
82. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, §§ 2-19, 16 Stat. 433; Act of April 20, 1871, ch.
22, §§ 1-7, 17 Stat. 13.
83. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-5, 18 Stat. 335.
84. See note 192 & accompanying text infra.
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the judges say it is." 8 5 Corporate interests were delighted that this was so
in the decades of the Gilded Age when the Court appeared as their savior
in a series of decisions that elevated laissez-faire capitalism to the stature of
a constitutional imperative. But criminal defendants and black Americans
who watched what they thought were solid constitutional rights evaporate into
legalistic mist during the same period would have taken greater comfort had
the Court followed not the gist of Chief Justice Hughes' remark, but the
maxim of the sixth century Emperor Justinian: "To know the laws, one
must grasp not only their words, but their force and power as well."86 The
spirit of interpretation by which the Court reversed the thrust and impact of
the fourteenth amendment to favor -the rich and powerful is marked by a
studied focus on words rather than on their force and power.
A.

Substantive Due Process: A Boon for Corporations

It is perhaps an accident of history, though a highly symbolic one, that
the first test case to come before the Supreme Court on the meaning of the
fourteenth amendment was presented not by poor blacks seeking judicial
vindication of political and civil rights, but by white businessmen from the
South who complained that a carpetbag monopoly law had deprived them
of economic benefits which they deemed to be a "privilege and immunity"
secured by the amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 7 Justice Miller,
writing for a 5-4 majority, ruled against the antimonopolistic plaintiffs largely
because he could not accept the sweeping contention of counsel for the
appellants, John A. Campbell,88 that the Court should strike down any state
law which abridged the "liberty" and "property right" of a citizen to live
under a laissez-faire system. Justice Stephen Field, a pistol-packing rugged
individualist from California, 9 wrote a strong dissent which cited Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations"° and which urged that the fourteenth amendment
was designed not only to protect blacks but to "protect the citizens of the
85. Hughes made the remark in an extemporaneous speech given in 1907 while he
was governor of New York. M. PusEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 204 (1951). During
the same period, Judge Andrew Bruce of North Dakota wrote: "We are governed by
It is our judges who formulate our public
our judges and not by our legislatures ....
policies and our basic law." A. BRUCE, Ti AMERICAN JUrGn 6, 8 (1924).
86. JUsTINIAN, DIGEST 1, 3:17.
87. See notes 72-78 & accompanying text supra.
88. Campbell was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1853 to 1861,
when he resigned to return to his native Alabama during the Civil War. See H. CONNOR, JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL (1920).

89. For a description of Justice Field, see C. SWISHER, STEPHN J. FIELD, CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW (1930).
90. A. SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776), cited in 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 110 n.1 (Field, J., dissenting).
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United States against the deprivation of their common rights by state legislation." 91 Among such "inalienable rights" was the "right to pursue a lawful
employment in a lawful manner, without other restraint than such as equally
affects all persons," 92 a right which Justice Field found to be violated by the
Louisiana monopoly. Although Justice Field served long enough on the
Court to see his broad interpretation of the due process clause utilized in a
substantive sense, implying the power of the Justices to read their own
economic beliefs into the Constitution, in 1873 he could not yet gather a
majority. Justice Miller, anxious to refute Justice Field's thesis, engaged in
judicial overkill, butchering the privileges and immunities clause so badly that
it would never again serve as a useful tool for securing civil rights.98 Further,
Justice Miller intimated that the fourteenth amendment had conferred on
Congress no general powers to regulate in the area of civil rights, and that
the states retained most of their original powers.9 4 The upshot of the case
was that it laid the foundation in Justice Field's dissent for substantive due
process; Judge Campbell in effect prevailed, although "not as the butchers'
attorney but as a Southerner and a Democrat hostile to broad national
powers." 95
The Supreme Court during this era, as during all other periods, was
composed of men who breathed in the atmosphere of their times. Several
of the Justices were conservative in outlook,9 6 having drawn not only their
fees but their opinions from corporate wealth. Predisposed to the businessman's point of view, they were convinced that the "manifest destiny" of the
nation lay in giving free rein to laissez-faire capitalism. The political and
economic context of the times in large measure explains decisions of the
Supreme Court during the Gilded Age, 97 but the legal historian must also
focus on the legal methodology used by the Justices to bestow their constitutional blessings on corporate "persons" during a time of phenomenal economic expansion and industrialism.
One device was a new interpretation of the phrase "due process of law,"
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 89 (Field, J., dissenting).
id. at 97.
83 U.S. (16Wall.) at75-81.
See id. at 77-78.
C. MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WArr: THE TRIUMPH

OF CHiciu-rER

117 (1963)

[hereinafter cited as MAGRATH].

96. As early as 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that lawyers in America, by virtue
of their training, tended to end up "eminently conservative and anti-democratic." 1 A.
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 285 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
For a recent
statement of the conservative character of the 20th century bench and bar, see J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:

LAWYERS AND SOCiAL CHANCE IN MODERN AMERICA

97. See pp. 23 6-40 infra.
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which appears in the text of the fourteenth amendment as well as in the fifth.
At least since 1833, the scope of the fifth amendment had been limited to
protection of the individual against attempts by the federal government to
deprive him of his right to grand jury indictment, of his right against double
jeopardy, of his right against the taking of life, liberty, or property without
adequate notice and a fair and full hearing, and of his right to just compensation if private property were taken for a public use. 9s Edwin S. Corwin
gathered considerable evidence on the meaning of due process before the Civil
War, and he doubted whether the phrase was ever meant to give the
courts power to restrict or overturn legislative action, even in matters of procedural fairness. 99 Whether or not Corwin is correct in his restrictive view
of due process, it is clear from his research that no more than a procedural
meaning was intended by the Founding Fathers. Consequently, Chief Justice Taney's use of due process in a substantive sense in Dred Scott v. Sandford'00 to legitimate the Court's voiding of the Missouri Compromise as an
unconstitutional regulation of economic conditions, marked an unfounded
departure from the original meaning of due process. And the subsequent
reliance on substantive due process by Justice Field and his colleagues proves
to be another species of fruit from a poisoned tree.
A second development which was incorporated into the judicial arsenal by
the Gilded Age Court was the Taney Court's acceptance of the principle that
a corporation was an artificial "person" for certain kinds of cases at common
law.' 01 This fiction, together with 'the Waite Court's acceptance in Santa
Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railway Co.' 0 2 of the proposition that corporations were intended by the framers to benefit as "persons" under the
fourteenth amendment, 1 3 served as a solid base for the expansion of judicial
protection of the rights of corporations.
98. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held that the Bill of Rights
applied only to the federal government, not to the states.
99. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARv.
L. REV. 366, 460 (1911).

100. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).

For a detailed discussion of the Dred Scott

decision, see V. HoPKINS, DRED ScoTr's CASE (1971); C.

SWISHER,

supra note 12, at

592-652.
101. See, e.g., Louisville, C. &C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844).

On the origins

and meaning of the doctrine of corporate personality, see Graham, An Innocent
Abroad: The Constitutional Corporate "Person", 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 155 (1955). For
the history of the Taney Court's acceptance of corporate personality, see C. SWISHER,

supra note 12, at 457-83.
102. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

103. The Court announced this boon to corporations in two brief sentences:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
applies to these corporations. We are all of the opinion that it does.
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Justice Field, then, had inherited from the Taney Court the notion of
corporate personality and the tool of substantive due process. However, his
attempts to combine the two in support of the position that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment charged the Court with the duty of protecting business enterprises against unfavorable economic regulation were
initially blocked by other policies with roots in the Taney Court, most notably
by Chief Justice Waite's "recognition that property rights are not absolute,
[his] broad view of the states' police powers, and a conscious deference to
legislative policy judgments.' u0 4 Although Justice Field's view was adopted
during the 1890's (after Chief Justice Waite and Justices Miller and Bradley
had been replaced by Melville Fuller, David Brewer and Henry Brown), his
efforts during the Waite era were restricted to the frequent dissents in which
he "waged a powerful though unsuccessful campaign for his view that the
1 5
Fourteenth Amendment was the guardian angel of vested property rights."'
While some seeds of Justice Field's victory were sown in his dissents, others
found receptive soil in casual dicta granted as doctrinal concessions by Chief
Justice Waite himself and the majority for whom he wrote. One example
of this pattern can be seen in the famous Granger Cases,10 6 in which Chief
Justice Waite upheld a series of statutes which were designed to protect Midwestern farmers from the Eastern-dominated railroads by subjecting the railId. at 396 (emphasis added).
One of the individuals principally responsible for the Court adopting this position was
Roscoe Conkling. Conkling, a shrewd railroad lawyer and a former member of Congress who had served on the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction which
drafted the fourteenth amendment, had stated in an argument before the Supreme Court:
"At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, individuals and joint stock companies were appealing for congressional and administrative protection against invidious
and discriminating state and local taxes." STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 18651877, at 137 (1966), quoting Roscoe Conkling. The argument that Congress meant to
protect corporations through the fourteenth amendment, coming as it did from one who
had direct input into the drafting process of the amendment, has prompted some
historians, most notably Charles and Mary Beard, in their RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION (1928), to suggest a "conspiracy theory" of the fourteenth amendment.
Under this theory, Conkling, together with John Bingham, another member of the
Joint Committee of Fifteen, subtly used their unsuspecting colleagues in Congress to promote the property interests of corporate "persons" while ostensibly protecting the civil
rights of blacks. For a detailed review and rejection of the "conspiracy theory," see
Boudin, Truth and Fiction About the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 N.Y.U.L. REv. 19
(1938), and Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47
YALE L.J. 371 (1938).
104. MAGRATH 185.
105. Id. 202.
106. Included under this title are Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), and seven
companion cases. For a discussion of the cases, see Fairman, The So-Called Granger
Cases, Lord Hale and Justice Bradley, 5 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1953).
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roads to regulation by public authorities. 10 7 Although the Chief Justice's
views as expressed in the principal case, Munn v. Illinois, 08 affirmed the
states' power to regulate the railroads and sparked a blistering dissent from
Justice Field (who asserted that the majority opinion was "subversive of the
rights of private property"' 09 ), there were two valuable elements buried in
the Munn opinion that would later support the business-oriented position of
Justice Field. The first was Chief Justice Waite's acknowledgement that
"under certain circumstances," unspecified in Munn, regulatory legislation
might violate due process."10 The second point flowed from the notion that
states could regulate property "affected with a public interest";"' it implied
that they could not regulate property "unaffected" with a public interest.
Half a century after Munn, Chief Justice William Howard Taft seized on the
inverse reactionary possibilities of the Munn doctrine and struck down regulatory statutes adverse to the economic and property interests which he and
2
his colleagues favored."1
By the end of the 19th century, the Court came to occupy a position so
close to the conservative views espoused by Justice Field that even he could
hardly have desired a more flattering epitaph-the voice of the lone dissenter
in Slaughter-House and Munn became the spokesman of the Court in Pollock
107. As described by Magrath, the contested statutes
varied from state to state, but the main features were similar: establishment of
maximum rates for railroad freight and passengers and for storing of grain by
direct legislative enactment or by regulatory commissions; prohibition of discriminatory rates between places by means of the so-called "shorthaul" clause;
and encouragement of competition by forbidding the consolidation of parallel
lines.
MAGRATH 175.
Depending on the railroads to get their produce to market swiftly and dependably,
many midwestem farmers had mortgaged their property to buy railroad shares, and had
paid high taxes to float bonds to attract railroads into their region, only to find that
once established, the railroads paid scant heed to the farmers' interests, charged them
exorbitant rates, and discriminated in favor of large, long-distance shippers. It should
also be noted that domestic manufacturing interests had secured from Congress high protective tariffs while agricultural products were unprotected and overproduced. Farmers
in the 1870's had double economic woes: prices for their basic commodities fell sharply
(corn by 32 percent and wheat by 49 percent) while inflation was running at 29 percent, thereby eroding their purchasing power. Id. 33-37.
108. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
109. Id. at 136 (Field, J., dissenting).
110. See id. at 125.
111. "[W]hen private property is devoted to a public use, it is subject to public
regulation." Id. at 130.
112. See Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Wolff Packing Co.
v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
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v. Farmer'sLoan & Trust Co. 113 and United States v. E.C. Knight Co."14 In
Pollock, the Court struck down a proposed graduated federal income tax on
corporate wealth.' 15 Justice Field viewed the tax with alarm as only the
beginning of an "assault on capital," which if left unchecked by the Court
would result in "a war of the poor against the rich . . . constantly growing

in intensity and bitterness."" 6 The Court's sanction of such a tax, said
Justice Field, would "mark the hour when the sure decadence of our government will commence."" 7 'In Knight, also known as the Sugar Trust Case,
the Court gravely weakened the 5-year-old Sherman Antitrust Act"l8 by
relying on an "artificial ,and mechanical separation of 'manufacturing' from
'commerce' without regard to their economic continuity or the effects of the
former on the latter." 1 9 And finally, three years after Pollock and Knight,
the Court rejected Chief Justice Waite's philosophy of judicial restraint and
deference to the legislature on matters concerning the reasonableness of
rates, 20 declaring "unreasonable" rates set by the state of Nebraska on a
public 'utility because the rates did not, in the judgment of a majority of Jus'tices, allow a "fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the
121
public convenience.'
While it is true that Justice Field could not have won over a Court to whom
his economic and social views were antithetical and that he clearly appeared
to the Court of the Gilded Age to speak with the voice of a prophet, it is
likewise correct to suggest that he and his colleagues were either innocent of
the historical data suggesting a procedural rather than a substantive meaning
to due process, 22 or that they consciously rejected this data when they em113. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reheard, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
114. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
115. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, §§ 27-37, 28 Stat. 553. It was not until ratification of the sixteenth amendment in 1913 that Justice Field's economics were undone.
116. 157 U.S. at 607.
117. Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
119. 1 B. ScHwARTZ, THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 186 (1963).
120. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. -155 (1877), in which Chief
Justice Waite stated:
Our province is only to determine whether [establishment of rates] could be
done at all, and under any circumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common good requires that it should be done.
Id. at 164.
121. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898).
122. See Corwin, supra note 99. For a discussion challenging Corwin's view of due
process, see MAGRATH 194-97. Relying in part on Graham, Procedure to SubstanceExtra-JudicialRise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CAL. L. REv. 483 (1952), and Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L.
REv. 479, 610, Magrath suggests:
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ployed substantive due process as a legal instrument with which they consummated an illegitimate union between the "Gospel of Wealth" and the United
States Constitution.
B. ProceduralDue Process: A Bane to CriminalDefendants
While the Gilded Age saw a flowering of Court-protected capitalism
through substantive due process, it also witnessed a diminution of procedural
rights which state criminal defendants, rightly or wrongly, believed to be
guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment. The paradoxical result
was that due process of law was held to protect the private property of corporate "persons" more meaningfully than ithe life and liberty of natural persons accused of a crime in a state court.
Just as Justice Hugo Black argued that the fourteenth amendment was not
intended to immunize corporations from state regulation, l 2 3 he also maintained in his famous Adamson v. California124 dissent that the first section
of the fourteenth amendment was intended "to guarantee that thereafter no
state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill
of Rights. ' 125 Justice Black maintained that the majority in Adamson, which
included Justice Frankfurter, had erred in holding that the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination was not binding in state prosecutions because
they had not taken the trouble "to appraise the relevant historical evidence
of the intended scope of the first section of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.' 20 Accordingly, Justice Black supplemented his historical essay with
a 31-page appendix consisting mainly of extracts from debates of the Congress that framed the fourteenth amendment.
Two years after Adamson, two Stanford Law School professors, Charles
Fairman and Stanley Morrison, published lengthy articles attacking Justice
[F]rom the very beginning [of the postwar Court], all of the justices regarded
due process as furnishing protection against any purely arbitrary actions by
government, irrespective of whether the arbitrary act occurred in a trial or in a
regulation of property.
MAGRATH 196.
123. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938), in which
Justice Black asserted:
The history of the [Fourteenth] Amendment proves that the people were told
that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not
told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from control
of state governments.
Id. at 87 (Black, J., dissenting).
124. 332U.S. 46 (1947).
125. Id. at 74-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 74.
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Black's views. 127 Fairman maintained that contemporary evidence in the
congressional debates, newspapers, campaign speeches of 1866, and gubernatorial messages, all of which called for ratification of the amendment and
records of state legislatures, "overwhelmingly" refuted Justice Black's incorporation thesis. 128 Morrison corroborated Fairman's findings by conducting
an examination of judicial interpretations of the fourteenth amendment, and
concluded that Black's dissent amounted "simply to an effort to put into the
1 29
Constitution what the framers failed to put there."'
The chief problem with Fairman's article is the limit of its scope to the
immediate background of the framing and ratification of the amendment. As
Leonard Levy has shown, the entire period of debate over slavery is relevant
to a proper historical understanding of the amendment.13 0 Furthermore,
Fairman's finding was negative: that there was not much evidence to support
Justice Black's conclusion. This technique, however, is exactly what he criticizes Justice Black for doing, that is, relying heavily on negative evidence and
drawing conclusions from arguments ex silentio.
The chief difficulty with Morrison's article is in its uncritical assumption
3
that the judges whose decisions he examined were competent historians.' '
As Levy points out, with the exception of the elder Harlan, the Justices relied
upon relatively unexamined historical data. 13 2 Although Levy faults both
Fairman and Morrison, he goes beyond them in attacking Black not merely
for writing ex parte law office history, but for mangling and manipulating
127. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?

The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The ludicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 140 (1949).
128. Fairman, supra note 127, at 139.
129. Morrison, supra note 127, at 173.
130. See Levy, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, in JUDGMENTS:
ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1972). Levy supports his position by
noting:
As early as the 1830's abolitionist theories . . . were employing due process,
privileges and immunities and equality to signify all fundamental rights ...
From press, pulpit, and platform, the phrases that found their way into the

Fourteenth Amendment's trilogy were invoked to support not only the abolition of slavery and equal civil rights for Negroes, but also freedom of speech,

press, conscience, petition, and assembly, as well as the procedural rights of
the criminally accused and such rights of property as making contracts and

enjoying the fruits of one's labor.
Id. at 70.
131. This same difficulty arises with Justice Rehnquist's reliance on the SlaughterHouse Cases for a "correct" interpretation of the equal protection clause, as discussed
in notes 72-78 & accompanying text supra.
132. Levy, supra note 130, at 69.
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it by his selectivity.' 3 3 Levy concludes by asserting that the historical record
is "not only complex and confusing; it is inconclusive,"' 134 and by judging
Fairman as the "better historian by far."' 13 5 He concedes, however, that
"even if history spoke with a loud, clear and conclusive voice, it ought not
to control judgment."' 3 6
On the larger issue of whether the Bill of Rights should be incorporated

into the fourteenth amendment, the Warren Court subsequently vindicated
Justice Black in all respects save for the fifth amendment provision for indictment by grand jury, the seventh amendment provision for jury trial in suits
at common law when the amount in controversy exceeds 20 dollars, and
the eighth amendment prohibition against excessive bail, none of which have
yet been made binding upon the states. After the landmark decisions of
Mapp v. Ohio,13 7 Benton v. Maryland,138 Malloy v. Hogan,13
North Carolina,

40

4

9

1 42

Duncan v. Louisiana,' ' Pointer v. Texas,'

Klopfer v.
Washington

44
v. Texas, 1 43 Gideon v. Wainwright,1
and Robinson v. California,14 5 Justice
Black wrote that while he was "not completely happy with the selective incor-

133. See id., in which Levy faults Justice Black for abusing history
by artfully selecting facts from one side only, by generalizing from grossly inadequate "proof," by ignoring confusion and even contradictions in the minds
of some of his key historical protagonists, and by assuming that silence on the
part of their opponents signified acquiescence.

Id. at 68.
134. Id. at 70.
135. Id.

136. Id. at 71.
137. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Mapp decision overruled Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949), and applied the exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment to state proceedings.
138. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment applied

to the states).
139. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In this case, the Court reversed Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and held that the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applied to the states.
140. 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment guarantee of a speedy trial applies to
state proceedings).
141. 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury effec-

tive in state proceedings).
142. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment provision for the confrontation of adverse witnesses extended to the states).
143. 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (state defendant has sixth amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining favorable witnesses).
144. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel in noncapital felony cases extended to the states).
145. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Robinson reversed O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323
(1892), and applied the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to the states.
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poration theory," it could be supported since "it has the virtue of having
worked to make most of the Bill of Rights' protections applicable to the
States."'14
In light of the evidence adduced by Howard Graham and Jacobus tenBroek on the antislavery origins of the "code words" used in the fourteenth
amendment, 1 47 it seeems now that Justice Black's view is more accurate historically as well as jurisprudentially than either he or Fairman anticipated.
In any event, it is against the background of this debate on the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment that the Gilded Age Court must be assessed in
its handling of procedural due process questions.
In 1884, the Court held in Hurtado v. California148 that the fifth amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment before the trial of a capital case
was not binding on a state despite the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Then in 1892, the Court ruled in O'Neil v. Vermont' 4 9 that
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was
not binding on a state. The Court reaffirmed its earlier Hurtado ruling in
1900 when it ruled in Maxwell v. Dowd'60 that a state may proceed to trial in
a criminal case without a grand jury indictment, and added that the sixth
amendment constituted no obstacle to the practice of trying defendants before
an eight-member petit jury. Finally, in the 1908 case of Twining v. New
Jersey,'5 ' the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that states only follow the "settled usages and modes or proceedings in the common and statute law of England" as modified by judges
in light of new circumstances; 52 it then added its historically unsound opinion
that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was not among such
"settled usages" and hence not "fundamental" enough to be binding on the
states.'53 Thus, at regular eight-year intervals, the Court denied to state
criminal defendants basic procedural safeguards found in the Bill of Rights,
but which according to the Court formed no part of the fourteenth amendment's command to the states against deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
146. H. BLACK, A CONSTrrUTIONAL FArrH 39-40 (1968).
iana, 391 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).

See also Duncan v. Louis-

147. See J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment, 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479, 610.
148.

110 U.S. 516 (1884).

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

144 U.S. 323 (1892).
176 U.S. 581 (1900).
211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Id. at 100.
See id. at 106-14.
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Throughout this period, one voice was consistently raised in protest, that
of the "great dissenter," Justice John Marshall Harlan, 5 4 whose career from
1877 to 1911 spanned almost the entire period of the Gilded Age. In
Hurtado,Justice Harlan wrote in lone dissent a masterful essay on the history
of the protection of fundamental human rights in the Anglo-American legal
system. He argued that the similarity of language in the fifth and fourteenth amendments shows an intention to have the safeguards that had been
applied to the federal government apply to the states.1 55
The O'Neil case raised the issue of whether the state of Vermont had
inflicted cruel and unusual punishment when it sentenced the defendant to
confinement at hard labor in a house of correction for 19,914 days for the
crime of "selling, furnishing, and giving away intoxicating liquor without
authority."' 6 Even Justice Field found this penalty excessive and dissented.
Justice Harlan filed a separate dissent in which he stated that he concurred
fully with Justice Field that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed "immunity
from cruel and unusual punishment" in state proceedings just as in federal
157
actions.
In Maxwell, Justice Harlan wrote another excellent historical essay, underscoring the Court's inverted values and inconsistency as reflected in its willingness to borrow from one section of the fifth amendment in order to expand
substantive due process benefits for corporate "persons" while contracting
procedural due process for natural persons by refusing to graft on to the
58
fourteenth amendment another section from the fifth amendment.1
Finally, in Twining, the lone dissenter, now an old man one year from
death, wrote the last of his attempts to educate his colleagues on the history
of due process in Anglo-American law. In the course of this last great dissent, he stated tartly:
154. Although Justice Holmes is also known as the "great dissenter," the elder HarSee A. BARTH, PROPHETS wrrH HONOR, GREAT
DISSENTS AND GREAT DISSENTERS IN THE SUPREME COURT 22-53 (1974); Beth, Justice
lan is at least as worthy of the title.

Harlan and the Uses of Dissent, 49 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1085 (1955).
110 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
144 U.S. at 325.
Id. at 370 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Harlan framed his view by stating:
If then the "due process of law" required by the Fourteenth Amendment
does not allow a State to take private property without just compensation, but
does allow the life or liberty of the citizen to be taken in a mode that is repugnant to the settled usages and the modes of proceeding authorized at the time
the Constitution was adopted and which was expressly forbidden in the National Bill of Rights, it would seem that the protection of private property is
of more consequence than the protection of the life and liberty of the citizen.

155.
156.
157.
158.

176 U.S. at 614 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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[A]s I read the opinion of the court, it will follow from the general
principles underlying it, or from the reasoning pursued therein,
that the Fourteenth Amendment would be no obstacle whatever in
the way of a state law or practice under which, for instance, cruel
or unusual punishments (such as the thumb screw, or the rack or
burning at the stake), might be inflicted. So of a state law which
infringed the right of free speech, or authorized unreasonable
searches or seizures of persons, their houses, papers or effects, or a
state law under which one accused of crime could be put in jeopardy
twice or oftener, at the pleasure of the prosecution, for the same
offense.

159

It is appropriate to conclude this overview of the Court's interpretation of
due process in the Gilded Age with the Twining case, for Twining illustrates
not only the Court's failure to attend to the relevant external history of the
antislavery origins of the language used in the fourteenth amendment, but
also a tragic instance of the Court's reliance on inaccurate data and erroneous
law office history. For example, in one sentence Justice Moody asserted in
Twining that he resorted to "every historical test by which the meaning of
the phrase [against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment] can be
tried."'160 Earlier in the opinion, however, he had confessed that he was
obliged to "pass by the meager records of early colonial times, so far
as they have come to our attention, as affording light too uncertain for guidance."' 16 Even earlier in his opinion, Justice Moody had cited the 1637
Massachusetts heresy trial of Anne Hutchinson, who freely and voluntarily
incriminated herself. Not finding the light of this case "too uncertain for
dissenting).
159. 211 U.S. at 125 (Harlan, J.,
It is interesting to note that many of the problems Justice Harlan anticipated did indeed go unaddressed for a significant period. For example, it was 1936 before the
Court, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), spoke clearly to the question of
impermissible methods of obtaining a confession. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated:
The rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand.
• . . It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and
the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.
Id. at 285-86.
Likewise, it was 1931 before the Court clearly protected freedom of the press and of
speech from invasion by state action in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); 1961
before the exclusionary rule which applied to the federal government in regard to evidence obtained in unlawful searches was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961); and 1969 before the double jeopardy protection of the fifth amendment was
extended to state proceedings in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
160. 211 U.S. at 110.
161. Id. at 108.
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guidance," he argued that the case proved that colonial judges were "not
aware of any privilege against self-incrimination Or any duty to respect it."'1 62
Conclusions drawn from a negative pregnant are always rather dubious, but
Justice Moody's is simply erroneous.
Only a few months before the Hutchinson trial, Anne Hutchinson's

brother-in-law John Wheelwright had refused to answer questions about the
orthodoxy of his views, grounding the refusal in his right against self-incrimination. Acting as a judge in the case, Governor Winthrop hastily explained
that his court neither meant to examine the defendant by compulsory means
nor sought to "draw matter from himself whereupon to proceed against
him."'16 3 Justice Moody's resort to "every historical test" of the meaning of
the fifth amendment apparently failed to disclose that the maxim Nemo
tenetur prodere seipsum ("no one is bound to betray himself") was widely
known and relied upon by the Puritans in Massachusetts.' 64
Justice Moody's historical excursus took him not only to the colonial period
but also into early English legal history. He took comfort in the absence
of a specific formula against self-incrimination in the Magna Charta and
noted that the practice of self-incriminatory examinations continued for more
than four centuries after 1215.16r This argument, however, is, as Leonard
Levy characterizes it, "mischievous over-simplification, a half-truth,"' 16 6 for it
fails to understand that the Magna Charta grew in meaning from a feudal
document protecting barons from the king to an instrument of quasi-constitutional dimensions protecting the expanding liberties of all English subjects.
As early as 1246, Henry HI condemned self-incriminating oaths as "repugnant to the ancient Customs of the Realm" and to "his Peoples Liberties."' 167
And by 1590, Robert Beale, the clerk of the Privy Council, could declare
that "by the Statute of Magna Carta and the olde lawes of this realme, this
othe for a man to accuse himself is utterly inhibited."' 68
162. Id. at 103-04.
163. A Short History of the Rise, Reign, and Ruin of the Antinomians, Familists
and Libertines, That Infected the Churches of New England (1649), reprinted in ANTINOMIANISM IN THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 194-95 (C. Adams ed. 1894).
164. See W. BRADFORD, BRADFORD'S HISTORY "OF PLIMOUTH PLANTATION" 465
(1898).
165. 211 U.S. at 102-08.
166. Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: History and Judicial History, 85
POL. SCi. Q. 1 (1969).
167. See CLOSE ROLLS OF THE REIGN OF HENRY IH, 1247-1251, at 221-22 (H.M.
Lyte ed. 1922).
168. See Beale, A Collection Shewinge what Jurisdicationthe Clergie Hath Hertofore
Lawfully Used, quoted in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL HisTORY 267, 280 n.21 (L. Levy ed. 1972).
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Justice Moody also misspoke himself when he claimed -that the Petition of
Right in 1628 contained no reference to self-incrimination.' 6 9 The Petition did
in fact address this issue by censuring as "not warrantable by the laws or statutes of this realm" an oath which had operated since 1626 to coerce confessions from opponents of a tax enacted by Charles I and euphemistically de70
scribed by him as a "loan."'
Looking at American colonial history, Justice Moody found significance in
the absence of a specific enjoinder of compulsory self-incrimination by the
Stamp Act Congress and the First Continental Congress, and the absence of
such a prohibition in the Northwest Ordinance.1 7' Failure to enumerate the
principle, however, does not prove that the colonists did not count it among
the fundamental rights guaranteed to them in the declaration by the First
Continental Congress that they were "entitled to the common law of
England,' 172 and implied in the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for
178
"judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law.'
Finally, in support of the conclusion that the right against self-incrimination
is not "an essential part of due process,"' 74 Justice Moody mentioned that
only six states provided such protection in their constitutions.' 7 5 Yet he
undermined the relevance of this statement by his acknowledgment that by
1776 the courts in all the new states protected the right, even if it was not
explicitly stated in the constitution of the state. 176 Further, his tally was
incorrect, since he overlooked similar provisions in the constitutions of
Delaware 177 and Vermont. 178 It should also be noted that the constitutions
169. 211 U.S. at 107-08.
170. The incriminating oath procedure is set forth in THE CONSTrrUTIONAL DocuMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION, 1625-1660, at 55 (S. Gardiner ed. 1906). The

Petition of Right is reprinted in id. at 69.
171. 211 U.S. at 108. The Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, and the Northwest Ordinance are
reprinted in

SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL

TIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS

LIBER-

270, 286, 392 (R. Perry

ed. 1959).

172. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress, Fifth Resolution,
reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 171, at 288.
173. Northwest Ordinance art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
171, at 395.
174. 211 U.S. at 106.
175. Id. at 91. Justice Moody made reference to the constitutions of Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
176. Id. at 92.
177. See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 15 (1776), reprinted in 1 DEL. CODE ANN.
at 110 (1974).
178. See VT. CONST. § 10 (1777), reprinted in SoURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
171, at 366. It should be noted, however, that Vermont was not admitted to the Union
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of the other states which failed to include a specific reference to the right
did not contain a separate bill of rights: every state having a bill of rights
guaranteed the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
In its holding that the fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination was not binding on the states, Twining typifies the tendency of the
Court during the Gilded Age to place the procedural meaning of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment in narrow, restrictive confines.
In its regrettable reliance on imprecise and inaccurate history, 17 9 cooked up
in the New Jersey Attorney General's office to win a case rather than to relate
the past truthfully, Twining represents a tragic instance of the principle that
justice delayed is justice denied.' 80
C.

Unequal Protectionof the Laws: Frustrated
Hopes for Blacks

The Court in the Gilded Age managed to butcher the privileges and
immunities clause beyond recognition or usefulness in the Slaughter-House
Cases, and it inverted the due process clause by expanding the property interests of corporate "persons" and contracting the procedural rights of criminal
defendants interested in protecting their life and liberty. It remains only to
survey the Court's astonishing treatment of the equal protection clause in
cases involving racial discrimination to complete the picture of reversal of the
historical meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
In no period of the Court's history is it more necessary to situate the
Justices in the political and economic context of their time than during the
Gilded Age. It is, of course, true that in no period of American history has
the Court been entirely apolitical, for the Court has the solemn duty of resolving constitutional questions and national issues which often have clear political overtones or ramifications.' 8 ' At least in this sense, then, the Supreme
Court has always been and probably always will be a political institution.
until March 1791, when its disputes with New York over granting land titles had been
settled.
179. Leonard Levy summarized the Court's understanding of history in Twining by
stating that
the opinion was founded on inaccurate and insufficient data. Contrary to the
Court's assertion, the right against self-incrimination did evolve as an essential
part of due process and as a fundamental principle of liberty and justice.
JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMER CAN CONSTrrtTIONAL HIsTORY 268 (L. Levy ed. 1972).
180. It was not until 1964, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that Twining
was overruled.

181. In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that "[sicarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."
A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMmuCA 137 (J. Mayer &M. Lerner ed. 1966). In
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Political history is especially relevant to understanding -the Court of the
Gilded Age because its members participated in the political life of the
country more actively than in other eras. Two Chief Justices were potential
nominees to the office of the Presidency: Salmon P. Chase avidly seeking
the Democratic nomination in 1868 and 1872,182 and Morrison R. Waite
unsuccessfully sought after by the Republicans in 1875 to run in the following year to succeed President Grant.'8 3 In response to efforts to put forward
his name in 1884, Justice Harlan, like Chief Justice Waite before him, replied
i84
that for him politics and judicial duties were "utterly irreconcilable."'
Another Associate Justice, David Davis, joined Chief Justice Chase in
maneuvering for the Presidency in 1872. When Chief Justice Waite suspected Justice Davis of doing so again in 1876, the Chief Justice made one
of his rare comments about a fellow judge, charging him with making "the
Supreme Court the anteroom of the White House."' 8
Much more significant than such political self-seeking, however, was the
direct involvement in 1877 of five members of the Court-Democrats Nathan
Clifford and Stephen J. Field, and Republicans Samuel F. Miller, William
Strong, and Joseph P. Bradley-in the Electoral Commission established by
Congress to resolve the crisis which developed when four states filed contested returns in the closest presidential race in history.'8 6 These Justices
not only ",followed the election returns," as Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley
would have said at a later date, they determined its outcome. In ruling on
light of this situation, de Toqueville stated that judges must know "how to understand
the spirit of the age, to confront those obstacles that can be overcome, and to steer out
of the current when the tide threatens to carry them away." Id. See also M. SHAImo,
LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT

(1964).

182. See MAGRATH 285.
183. Chief Justice Waite refused to consent to having his name forwarded for the
Presidency, declaring:
I have now no other ambition than to fill worthily the high office to which I
have been called. To me it is the most desirable as well as the most honorable
position in the government ....
I would rather die with a name fit to be associated with those of my great predecessors than be 40 times a President.
Draft of an undated letter in Chief Justice Waite's Aug.-Dec. 1874 correspondence,
quoted in Magrath 280.
184. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The
Transformation of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 677 (1957).
185. Letter from Morrison R. Waite to Ellhu B. Washburne, Apr. 30, 1876, quoted
in MAGRATH 286. Two other justices so tempted were Justice Field, in both 1880 and
1884, and Justice Miller in 1884. It is the opinion of Magrath that, of the two, Justice
Field was far more interested in the possibility of a presidential nomination. See id.
at 286-87.
186. For an extended description of the contested election, see P. HAWORTH, THE
HAYES-TILDEN ELECTION OF 1876 (1906); C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 1619, 150-165 (1951).
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each of the 20 disputed electoral college votes, the Justices split along straight
party lines, with the result that the office of the presidency, badly marred
by the scandal and corruption rampant during the second administration of
General Grant, was assigned by the Commission to Rutherford B. Hayes, the
Republican Governor of Ohio, rather than to his Democratic opponent, Samuel J. Tilden, the Governor of New York, who had a popular majority of
some 250,000 votes and probably a slight majority in the electoral college as
87
well.'
"This outrageous display of partisanship," states historian John Garraty,
"made Hayes President and left the Democrats more convinced than ever
that their candidate had been deprived of office by fraud."'18 8 Although
Garraty makes no comment as to the impact of the episode on the Court,
C. Peter Magrath, biographer of Chief Justice Waite, argues that the "Court
as a whole came through the Disputed Election crisis comparatively unscathed." 189 Magrath is of the opinion that "the Court was not very vulnerable to charges of having debased itself during the crisis of 1876," and suggests the contrary: that "by doing its best with an unusual and nasty chore
it assisted in ending one of the Republic's few really serious political
crises."' 190 Magrath's rationale for absolving the highly partisan performance
of the Justices on the Electoral Commission-"virtually everyone else in the
country" would have behaved that way" 9"-is hardly an adequate standard,
even pre-Watergate, for evaluating the official acts of members of the highest
tribunal in the land. Additionally, his conclusion on the impact or consequences of the episode on the Court is too facile, for in restricting the focus
of judgment to only the immediate context of the Commission's work,
Magrath overlooks the connection between the outcome of the Hayes-Tilden
election and the infamous Compromise of 1877. According to the terms
of this political horsetrading, Democrats consented to Hayes' election in
187. Tilden needed only one of the disputed electoral votes in order to prevail and
it has been suggested that in an honest election, Tilden might have prevailed over Hayes
in Florida, although not in Louisiana or South Carolina. See C. WOODWARD, supra note
186, at 19. It is impossible, however, to be certain of this outcome since the estimates
are based largely on the fact that blacks, who at that time voted Republican as a solid
bloc, were in a majority in Louisiana and South Carolina, but not in Florida. One of
the few things that is certain concerning the election of 1876 is the unprecedented degree of fraud and corruption which surrounded it. In the three Southern states in question, black Republicans were kept from the polls by force and intimidation, while Republican election officials systematically threw out or invalidated thousands of Democratic
ballots. See J.GARRATY, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH: 1877-1890, at 259-60 (1968).
188. J. GRTY, supra note 187, at 260.

189.

MAGRATI

294.

190. Id. at 294-95.
191. Id. at 294.
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return for a Republican promise to end the era of radical Reconstruction in
the South. 192 It is beside the point to argue that there is no evidence to
demonstrate that five Justices who sat on the Electoral Commission also participated formally in negotiating the terms of the Compromise, which was
more a tacit agreement among party leaders than a formal document or binding contract. The point is that all of the Justices, not merely those who
served on the Commission, were fully aware of the Compromise. Breathing
in the political atmosphere of the day, all of them, with the exception of
Justice Harlan, deemed it their duty to act as guardians of the Compromise
and to pronounce their judicial benediction on its basic terms in the civil
rights cases heard from 1877 down to the close of the Gilded Age.
The remarkable shift in the Republican party's strategy toward the South
by the Compromise of 1877 can be explained in terms of political opportunism calculated to keep a Republican in the White House. Louis M. Hacker
notes that by 1877 the "old" radical Republicans-men like Thaddeus
Stevens, Charles Sumner, and George Julian, who were abolitionists committed to political, social and economic equality for blacks-were either dead or
politically impotent and had been replaced by the "new" radicals-men like
Roscoe Conkling, John Logan, and James Blaine, who were opportunists
eager to woo the votes of Southern blacks as long as they were necessary
to maintain the thin majority of their party, but who were willing to abandon
their struggle for civil rights once an alliance had been forged with Western
19 3
interests sympathetic to industrial capitalism.
Economic history also has general relevance to the performance of the
Court during the Gilded Age,' 94 and there was a direct link between economic history and the Compromise of 1877, which was not only a barometer
of the political climate of the day, but a reflection of the economic mood of
the country as well. Northern businessmen interested in the economic
expansion of the South preferred a policy of "moderation" to the grant of
real political power to Southern blacks, since the latter policy had provoked
turmoil and violence, which in turn impeded the flow of capital to the area.' 9 5
192. The details of the Compromise provided that the Democrats would (1) allow
Hayes to become President; (2) allow the Republicans to organize the House of Representatives; (3) protect blacks' rights in the South; and (4) help to revive the Republican
party in the South. The Republicans agreed to (1) recognize the election of Demo.
cratic states in Louisiana and South Carolina; (2) end the stationing of federal troops
to enforce Reconstruction in the South; (3) aid in securing internal improvements for
Southern states, including an East-West railroad via a southern route; (4) include some
Southern Republicans in Hayes' cabinet; and (5) give more federal jobs to Southerners.
See C. WooDwARD, supra note 186.
193.

See L. HACKER, TiE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM 339-45

194. See notes 9, 12, 13 & accompanying text supra.
195. Magrath characterizes the situation by noting:

(1940).
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It is against the background of this external political and economic history,
then, that the Supreme Court's use of the internal legal history of the
fourteenth amendment and the accompanying Civil Rights Acts of 1866,
1870, 1871 and 1875 must be evaluated. As Gunnar Myrdal has reminded
us in his classic work on racism in America, "it must not be forgotten that
the decisions of the Court had themselves a substantial share in the responsibility for the solidification of the Northern apathy."' 196 In 1876, 100 years
after American revolutionaries had declared as a self-evident truth that "all
men are created equal," the Court handed down two voting rights cases
which weakened the notion that black Americans shared in this vision of
equality. 19 7 Taken together, these cases helped set the pattern for subsequent developments in fourteenth amendment analysis.
In United States v. Cruikshank,20 3 the other voting rights case of the same
found guilty under section 4 of the Enforcement Act of May 31, 187019
for refusing to receive and count the vote of a black man. Chief Justice
Waite abandoned his usual philosophy of judicial deference to the legislature
and found the penal sections of the 1870 Act not "appropriate legislation"
for enforcing the fifteenth amendment. 200 According to the Chief Justice,
"[ilt is only when the wrongful refusal at such an election is because of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, that Congress can interfere, and provide for its punishment."' 201 On this narrow construction of the amendment,
When it became clear that the price to be paid for Negro equality included
continuing military rule and a certain amount of violence-at the cost of business profits---there could be but one outcome. Capitalism was on the march
and surely the Republican Party, its political prophet, would not stand in the
way.
MAGRATH 115. See also P. BUCK, THE ROAD TO REUNION (1937), in which the author
writes: "When theories of Negro equality resulted in race conflict, and conflict in
higher prices of raw cotton, manufacturers were inclined to accept the view of the Southern planter rather than that of the New England zealot." Id. at 154.
196. G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 516 (1944).
197. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876). The cases were brought under the Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, §§ 1-23, 16 Stat. 140. This Act had been passed pursuant to the powers given
Congress under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment and represented a comprehensive
attempt to guarantee federal enforcement of the right to vote by blacks in the South.
Section 4 of the Act, which was challenged in Reese, penalized the hinderance of any
person from qualifying to vote, while section 6, the provision involved in Cruikshank,
prohibited banding together or conspiring to deprive a citizen of rights secured by the
Act.
198. 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
199. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 64, 16 Stat. 140.
200. 92 U.S. at 221.
201. Id. at 218.
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he voided key sections of the Enforcement Act as a far-reaching invasion of
states' rights. He did so by a strange bit of inverted logic, construing the
statute to mean more than it actually said, so -that he could then conclude
that by meaning that much, Congress had gone beyond the scope of the
20 2
amendment.
In United States v. Cruikshank,203 the other voting rights case of the same
year, sophistry reigned supreme when the Court reversed a conviction under
section 6 of the 1870 Act. Early in 1873, a group of about 300 blacks had
attended a political meeting at the Grant Parish Courthouse in the town of
Colfax, Louisiana, the rally ending in a terrible riot. 20 4 Believing the incident to be a vicious instance of a racially motivated attack on blacks in order
to inhibit the exercise of their civil rights, the Justice Department secured
indictments for almost 100 white men. Nine defendants, including Cruikshank, were subsequently arrested and found guilty on charges of conspiring
to interfere with the blacks' right to assemble, to bear arms, to vote, and to
obtain equal protection of the laws safeguarding persons and property. Presiding over the trial jointly with Circuit Judge William Woods, Justice Bradley
voiced a difference of opinion with his colleague over the sufficiency of the
indictment. 20 5 In his circuit opinion, Justice Bradley stated that the affirmative protection of the fundamental rights of citizenship "does not devolve
upon [the federal government] . . .but belongs to the state government
as a part of its residuary sovereignty. '20 6 Under this view, the fourteenth
amendment gave to Congress no affirmative power to furnish redress against
hostile state laws, for "the only constitutional guaranty of. . . privileges and
immunities is, that no state shall pass any law to abridge them .... -207
While Justice Bradley acknowledged that the fifteenth amendment concededly empowered Congress to forbid "outrage, violence, and combinations
on the part of individuals" '20 8 interfering with the right to vote, he believed
that the indictments in the case were defective for failure to aver improper
state action and for failure to allege racial animus as the basis of the mass
killing of blacks at the courthouse. Chief Justice Waite expressed an incredible degree of naivet6 and legal sophistry when he upheld Justice Bradley on
202. See id. at 220-21.
203. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).

204. A marker outside the town of Colfax tells the white Southerners' version of the
event: "On this site occurred the Colfax Riot in which three white men and 150
Negroes were slain. This event on April 13, 1873 marked the end of carpetbag misrule
in the South." Cited in C. FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 1377.
205. United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (No. 14,897) (C.C.D. La. 1874).
206. Id. at 710.
207. Id. at 714.

208. Id. at 713.
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the insufficiency of the indictments, stating, "We may suspect that race was
the cause of the hostility; but it is not so averred. '209 More ominous for
future interpretation of the fourteenth amendment was his conclusion that the
amendment did not reach the indictments in Cruikshank.210
The tragic implication of Cruikshank and Reese for black Americans was
poignantly highlighted in two letters of the period written by federal attorneys
working in the South. In 1875, while the cases were still pending on the
Supreme Court docket, a band of whites murdered four blacks after an election in Columbus, Mississippi, and as a result of such violent intimidation the
voting strength of blacks in that town dropped from 1,200 to 17.211 Henry
Whitfield, United States Attorney in the area, reported that prosecutions
would be "utterly futile":
Notorious violations of the election laws have been absolutely
ignored by grand jurors who had direct and personal knowledge of
the violation. It is impossible to get the witnesses, who have personal knowledge of the facts, to tell the truth, or what they know,
even, in presence of the grand jury, for fear of their lives, or for
considerations of policy, protection of personal friends, accomplishment of political and party purposes etc .....
The only hope now is through the officers and Court of the
United States. If these fail, then a large mass of the people here
are without remedy, or protection, by reason of the practicalnullifi2 12
cation of the Constitutionand laws of the Country.
Nearly three years after the Court dashed that "only hope" in Reese and
Cruikshank, another federal attorney, L. C. Northrop, gave a vivid description of the situation he faced in Charleston, South Carolina:
I have 'been forced by 'the unfortunate condition here, to give
to Reese et al and Cruikshank et al my severest study. I made
209. 92 U.S. at 556.
210. Id. at 554-56. The Chief Justice reached this result by reasoning that the fourteenth amendment
prohibits a State from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws; but this provision does not . .. add any thing to the
rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another. The
equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism ....
[But]
that duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still remains there. The
only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the States do not
deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but no more. The power of
the national government is limited to the enforcement of this guaranty.
Id. at 554-55.
211. MAGRTrI125.
212. Letter from Henry Whitfield to Edwards Pierrepont, Nov. 6, 1875, quoted in
MAoRATH 125.
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last spring a careful abstract with notes, of these and all kindred
cases and came to the conclusion then, which is much stronger now,
that with the single exception of a few sections, relating to the
elections of federal officers, the federal election laws are a delusion
and farce .... If red shirts break up meetings by violence, there is

no remedy, unless it can be proved to have been done on account
or race, etc., which cant [sic] be proved. .

.

. It is hard to sit

quietly and see such things, with the powerful arm of the Government, bound in conscience to protect its citizens, tied behind its
back by these decisions. With colored men crowding my office, it
213
is hard to make them understand my utter helplessness.
In 1883, in cases involving legislation enforcing the equal protection
clause, the Court delivered two more severe blows to the civil rights advocates. In United States v. Harris,21 4 -the Court invalidated section 2 of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,215 which provided penalties in cases involving
conspiracies to deprive individuals of the equal protection of the laws. This
provision, wrote Justice William B. Woods (another Hayes appointee),
exceeded the authority given to Congress in the fourteenth amendment,
because the amendment did not reach acts of private persons. Congress was
therefore powerless to curb the Klan's lynching and mob violence because
such activity was not carried on by state officers or under color of state law.
Nor could the federal government lay upon the states an affirmative duty
to protect black citizens from Klan terrorism, for the Civil War Amendments
reached only "state action," not state inaction or sins of omission of the
grossest sort.
Magrath states that it was the Civil Rights Cases216 "that pleased the South
most and best signif[y] the Supreme Court's role as constitutional guardian
of the Compromise of 1877. '' 217 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court was
faced squarely with a choice between Jim Crow 21 8 and the Civil Rights Act
213. Letter from L.C. Northrop to Charles Devens, Jan. 14, 1879, quoted in MA132-33.
214. 106 U.S.629 (1883).
215. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 114, § 2,17 Stat. 13.
216. 109 U.S.3 (1883).
217. MAGRATH 142.
218. This was the name given to a series of segregation laws which rigidly and systematically excluded blacks from contact or communication with whites. As Woodward noted, these laws
lent the sanction of the law to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and
schools, to housing and jobs, to eating and drinking. Whether by law or by
custom, they extended to virtually all forms of public transportation, to sports
and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and asylums, and ultimately
to funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries.
C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CRow 7 (3d rev. ed. 1974).
GRATH
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of 1875.219 The latter was the most significant piece of civil rights legislation
enacted by the Congress to enforce the Civil War Amendments. Five cases,
involving denial of equal service or accommodations to blacks in a theater
in San Francisco, an opera house in New York, and a hotel, restaurant,
and train in the South were consolidated for a decision on the constitutionality
of the Act. It seems difficult today, more than a decade after the Court
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964,220 to imagine that the Court previously
found a similar Act of Congress unconstitutional. But the Court of the
Gilded Age did just that, striking down the equal accommodations provisions
of the 1875 Act 'by a vote of eight to one. Building on the "state action"
foundation laid by Chief Justice Waite in Cruikshank, the Court held that
the fourteenth amendment only spoke to actions by state officials and did
"not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation
of private rights .... -221 And, as if blacks needed a reminder that the
days of Reconstruction were over and that the welcome mat for blacks on
their way to the court had been removed, Justice Bradley added with cruel
irony that the effects of slavery wear off over time and that there comes a
time when the former slave "takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases
'222
to be the special favorite of the laws."
It was the elder Justice Harlan, a Kentucky colonel and former slaveholder,2 2 3 previously opposed to the ratification of all three Civil War Amend219. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§ 1-5, 18 Stat. 335. The specific section of the
Act challenged provided in part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations . . . of inns, public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable
alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition
of servitude.
Id. § 1.
220. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). See also
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
221. 109 U.S. at 11.
222. id. at 25.
223. Justice Harlan's nomination to the Supreme Court was opposed by a Union
Army General who wrote to the Senate Judiciary Committee that, during the Civil War,
Harlan had told him that he
had no more conscientious scruples in buying and selling a horse, that the right
of property in a Negro was identical with that of the property in a horse, and
that the liberation of slaves by our general government was a direct violation
of the Constitution of the United States.
Letter from Speed S. Fry to William Brown, Nov. 2, 1877, quoted in Westin, supra note
184, at 669-70.
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ments, who, to quote Justinian, showed greater understanding of the histori'22 4
cal "force and power" of those Amendments, "not merely of their words.
His dissent remains today a masterpiece of judicial wisdom. 225
The Court during the Gilded Age also displayed considerable ability at
sleight of hand in its use of the commerce clause to defend Jim Crow. In
1878, the Court struck down a Louisiana law prohibiting segregation on
steamboats by employing the rule of Cooley v. Wardens226 to hold that regulation of steamboats traveling up and down the Mississippi required uniform
national regulation. 227 But in 1890, in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas
Railway Co. v. Mississippi,228 the Court upheld as only intrastate in scope
a Jim Crow law requiring segregation on railroad cars traveling within the
state of Mississippi, even though Congress had presumably exercised its plenary power and "occupied the field" by the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act 229 in 1887. Justice Harlan again dissented, pointing out the obvious inconsistency in commerce clause interpretation, and implied that the
only consistency in the cases was the interest of the Court in upholding seg230
regation.
Given a green light by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases and
the Mississippi railroad case, some legislatures proceeded to expand the reach
224. JUsTINIAN, DIGEST 1, 3:17.
225. The dissent reads in part:
I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent
amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious
verbal criticism. . . . Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need be,
rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship,
have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish,
which they attempted to accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law.
109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
What I affirm is that no State, nor the officers of any State, nor any corporation or individual wielding power under State authority for the public benefit or the public convenience, can, consistently either with the freedom established by the fundamental law, or with that equality of civil rights which now
belongs to every citizen, discriminate against freemen or citizens, in those
rights, because of their race, or because they once labored under the disabilities
of slavery imposed upon them as a race.
Id. at 59.
226. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). In Cooley, Justice Curtis ruled that the
cmigressional commerce power, although plenary, was concurrent with that of the states,
at least as to those matters affecting commerce which do not of their nature require uniform national resolution.
227. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878).
228. 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
229. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
230. 133 U.S. at 594 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
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of Jim Crow into every nook and cranny of social life. 23 1 C. Vann Woodward
noted that the purpose of the Jim Crow laws was to sustain the illusion of
white superiority and that their effect was to promote the illusion of black
inferiority. 23 2 In 1896, the Court had an opportunity to curb such racial
aggressions in the celebrated case of Plessy v. Ferguson.283 Instead, it
upheld a Louisiana statute which was enacted "to promote the comfort of

passengers on railway trains" by requiring "equal but separate accommodations" on trains. 23 4 The plaintiff, Homer Adolph Plessy, had challenged
the statute in the court of state judge John Ferguson on fourteenth amendment grounds, contending that state action requiring racial segregation
violated the equal protection clause. Justice Henry B. Brown, appointed to
the Supreme Court in 1890 by President Harrison, upheld Judge Ferguson's
rejection of this contention, reflecting the apathy to the race problem shared
by the eight-man majority on the Court and probably a similar proportion
of the country.235 In framing his customary dissent, Justice Harlan penned
some of his most memorable phrases, including his prediction that "the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the
23 6
decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott case."1
By way of explanation of the reasons for the stance he assumed in the dissent, he stated:
231. Woodward cites a host of state and local enactments mandating segregation in a
variety of settings, including an Alabama law which prohibited white female nurses
from attending to black male patients; an Oklahoma law which banned interracial boating or fishing; North Carolina and Virginia statutes which outlawed fraternal organizations that permitted members of different races to address each other as "brother"; New
Orleans ordinances providing for separate red-light districts for segregated prostitutes;
and a Birmingham ordinance which made it unlawful for blacks and whites to play dominoes or checkers "together or in each other's company." C. WOODWARD, supra note
218, at 99, 118, 100, & 102.
232. As Woodward characterizes it, this purposeful humiliation
put the authority of the state or city in the voice of the street-car conductor,
the railway brakeman, the bus driver, the theater usher, and also into
the voice of the hoodlum of the public parks and playgrounds. They [Jim
Crow laws] gave free rein and the majesty of the law to mass aggressions that
might otherwise have been curbed, blunted or deflected.
Id. at 107-08.
233. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
234. Acts of 1890, No. 111, quoted in A. BARTH, supra note 154, at 30.
235. Justice Brown wrote with remarkable smugness and insensitivity:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.
163 U.S. at 551.
236. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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The destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the common
government of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be
28 7
planted under the sanction of law.
Finally, in 1908 in Berea College v. Kentucky, 238 the Court sustained a
Kentucky statute which, by prohibiting integration in privately incorporated
educational institutions, forced the college to close its doors to black students.
Seeking to avoid the obvious constitutional issue in the case, the Court based
its decision on the right of the states to change the terms of corporate charters granted by the legislature. The elder Justice Harlan saw through this
ploy and noted that the Kentucky statute was not really a regulation of corporate business, but was essentially an education statute requiring racial segregation and was therefore void under the equal protection clause as
an "invasion of the rights of liberty and property guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against hostile state action .... "239 The aging gadfly
left his colleagues with a poignant and penetrating question in his last dissent
in a civil rights case:
Have we become so inoculated with prejudice of race that an American government, professedly based on the principles of freedom,
and charged with the protection of all citizens alike, can make distinctions between such citizens in the matter of their voluntary
meeting for innocent purposes simply because of their respective
races?

240

IV.

CONCLUSION:

HISTORY AS A NECESSITY AND A DUTY

Justice Harlan's question in Berea College has stinging force when it is
remembered that the Supreme Court during the Gilded Age had moved,
gradually at first but then with increasing momentum, to a position adverse
to state regulation of corporate "persons" when their profits would thereby
fall below a judicially determined "reasonable rate."' 241 In Berea College,
237. Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
239. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Speaking to the question of incorporation,
Justice Harlan noted:
There is no magic in the fact of incorporation which will so transform the act
of teaching the two races in the same school at the same time that such teaching can be deemed lawful when conducted by private individuals, but unlaw-

ful when conducted by the representatives of corporations.
Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 69 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
241. See L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERiCAN CoNsTrrU'IoN: 1877-1917,
at 191 (1971).
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in which the issue concerned people rather than profits, and equal educational opportunity rather than a "fair return" on corporate investment, the
Court found no difficulty in allowing the Commonwealth of Kentucky to
intervene in the business of an educational "corporation" and to radically
alter its policy under the guise of modifying its corporate charter.
The irony of the Berea College case, then, symbolizes the paradoxical
result of the judicial interpretation of the fourteenth amendment in the first
four decades after the amendment was adopted. In 1873, the SlaughterHouse Court butchered the privileges and immunities clause beyond recognition or usefulness. The Court then transformed the due process clause, giving it substantive content in the area of economic regulation of corporations,
an area almost certainly not intended by its framers, while limiting its sweep
in the area of procedural fairness ,to criminal defendants, an area most clearly
intended by the framers. And by the close of the Gilded Age, the Court
had repeatedly instructed, black Americans that Congress was powerless
to reverse the blatantly unequal protection of the laws which they experienced after the Compromise of 1877, when a dubiously elected President sacrificed the cause of racial justice in the name of national conciliation
and a Chief Justice led the Supreme Court in pronouncing solemn constitutional benediction on the arrangement.
Hopefully it is clear that the law does not have a life all its own and that
one cannot, therefore, understand legal history without raising questions of
political, economic, and social history as well. Hopefully it has also become
clear from the sorts of cases reviewed that the quality of the Court's use of
history should not be of interest to constitutional scholars and lawyers and
other professional specialists alone. The Supreme Court in our society has
been entrusted not with the business of maintaining political compromises
which benefit a few or even a majority, but with the nobler task of safeguarding for all "a constitution . . .intended to endure for ages to come" 242 as
a basic statement of constitutive social meaning which "We the People...
do ordain and establish. ' 243 Hence, the Court's public 'authority in American
life can only be diminished when it fails to be attentive, intelligent, and
reasonable in its use of history. Conversely, the Court can only increase its
stature when it shows reverence for our past heritage, especially as it is
expressed in the documents which we have enshrined as fundamental or constitutive of our national self-understanding, when it displays insight not only
as to the original intent of such documents, but also as to their present meaning in a rapidly changing world, and when it recognizes that "the law is not
242. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
243. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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majestic enough in the American system to endure for good but unexplained
' '244
or unexplicable reason.
Justice Holmes once wrote that "it ought always to be remembered that
historic continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity. '245 In
light of the above considerations, however, the Court would do better to heed
Justice Frankfurter's revision of Justice Holmes' distinction without a difference, and to acknowledge that judges
are under a special duty not to over-emphasize the episodic aspects
of life and not to undervalue its organic processes-its continuities
and relationships. For judges at least it is important to remember
that continuity with the past is not only a necessity but even a
246
duty.

244. C.

MILLER,

245. O.W.

supranote 38, at 14.

HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

139 (1920).

246. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 534-35 (1947).

